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Korematsu Overruled? Far From It: The Supreme
Court Reloads the Loaded Weapon
Lorraine K. Bannai1
In Trump v. Hawaii, Justice Roberts, on behalf of a majority of the
Supreme Court, upheld the Trump administration’s ban on travel from mainly
Muslim-majority countries despite abundant evidence that the ban was
motivated by anti-Muslim hostility.2 In response to Justice Sotomayor’s
powerful dissent, which observed the numerous ways in which the majority’s
reasoning paralleled the Court’s reasoning in Korematsu v. United States, the
infamous decision that upheld the mass removal of Japanese Americans
during World War II, Justice Roberts said that “Korematsu has nothing to do
with this case.”3 Despite attempting to distinguish the travel ban from the
Japanese American incarceration, Justice Roberts took the opportunity to
repudiate Korematsu: “Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided,
and has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—has no place
in law under the Constitution.”4
WHAT DOES IT MEAN THAT THE COURT OVERRULED KOREMATSU?5
DOES IT MEAN ANYTHING AT ALL?
There is, of course, some importance to the fact that, at least in words, the
Supreme Court expressly stated what so many have known for years: that
Korematsu was “gravely wrong.” In so stating, it rightly said it erred 74 years
earlier when it upheld the mass removal of an entire community.6 However,
the Court’s purported overruling of Korematsu is hollow when, in the same
breath, it affirmed a presidential proclamation born of branding a whole
group of people as terrorists based on unfounded religious stereotypes.7 At
the same time it said it disavowed Korematsu, the Court applied the same
dangerous reasoning it used in that case: it abdicated its role as a check on its
co-equal branches of government by accepting, without question, the
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government’s claim that its actions were required by national security; it
turned a blind eye to the foundation of prejudice, stereotype, and hate upon
which the challenged orders rested; and, as a consequence, it has now
“reloaded” the loaded weapon Justice Jackson feared when he wrote his
Korematsu dissent.8
First, what exactly did the Court overrule when it overruled Korematsu?
One can only guess. The Court in Korematsu embraced a number of
dangerous principles, and, in Trump v. Hawaii, the Court failed to identify
which principle or principles it was repudiating. For example, when most
think of Korematsu, they think of it as infamously upholding the mass
removal and incarceration of Japanese Americans—acts we know were based
solely on their race.9 But in overruling Korematsu, did the Court condemn
only that wartime incarceration? Or can its ruling be read more broadly to
condemn any removal or incarceration of a group based on race? Did it
repudiate the removal and incarceration of Japanese Americans because, in
hindsight, the government’s evidence of military necessity was lacking,
suggesting that such a race-based removal and incarceration would be proper
on another set of facts?
While Korematsu is most often condemned for upholding an egregious
racial discrimination, the decision has also rightfully been condemned for
other reasons: because of the weak and illogical nature of its reasoning10;
because it has been shown to have been decided on a fraudulent record11; and,
as further explained next, because it set the perilous precedent that courts
have no role when the government claims its actions are based on national
security concerns.12
Although the Court failed to identify the aspect of Korematsu it overruled,
given its conclusion upholding a presidential travel ban shown to be rooted
in anti-Muslim animus, it overruled very little. One thing is clear: the Court’s
opinion itself shows it did not overrule one of the most dangerous aspects of
Korematsu—the proposition that courts should step aside and defer to the
government’s actions whenever the government claims that they are justified
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by national security.13 Instead of burying Korematsu, the Court’s opinion
upholding the travel ban gave that dangerous principle of deference employed
in Korematsu new life. Justice Sotomayor stated this point well in her dissent.
While recognizing that the Court took an “important step” in “finally
overruling Korematsu,” it had done nothing to change its stance of judicial
abdication upon which that decision was based.14 She explained, “[b]y
blindly accepting the government’s misguided invitation to sanction a
discriminatory policy motivated by animosity toward a disfavored group, all
in the name of a superficial claim of national security, the Court redeploys
the same dangerous logic underlying Korematsu and merely replaces one
‘gravely wrong’ decision with another.”15
During World War II, the Supreme Court stepped aside when Gordon
Hirabayashi, Minoru Yasui, and Fred Korematsu asked it to rule
unconstitutional the orders that led to the incarceration of 120,000 persons of
Japanese ancestry.16 The Court said that it had no role in questioning
government decisions on issues involving national defense: “Where, as they
did here, the conditions call for the exercise of judgment and discretion and
for the choice of means by those branches of the Government on which the
Constitution has placed the responsibility of warmaking, it is not for any court
to sit in review of the wisdom of their action or substitute its judgment for
theirs.”17 In Hawaii v. Trump, the Court similarly said it had no role in
questioning the judgment of the president in the travel ban case: “we cannot
substitute our own assessment for the Executive’s predictive judgments on
[national security] matters, all of which ‘are delicate, complex, and involve
large elements of prophecy.’”18
Thus, what still persists is the very real danger that whenever the
government claims its actions are based on national security—even actions
that may, in intent or impact, single out racial or religious groups—the courts
will, as they did in Korematsu and Trump v. Hawaii, step aside and defer to
the government’s judgment, fail to serve their democratic function as a check
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on government power, and fail to protect vulnerable communities as well as
the rights and values contained in our constitution and laws.
Second, as it did during World War II, the Court accepted, without
question, the government’s self-serving “evidence” that its actions were
justified. During World War II, in Korematsu, the government—lacking any
specific evidence that Fred Korematsu or any Japanese American had
committed or threatened to commit any acts of espionage or sabotage—based
its claim of military necessity on the Final Report of General John L. DeWitt,
Commander of the Western Defense who oversaw the program of removal
and incarceration.19 In his dissent in Korematsu, Justice Jackson criticized the
Court’s reliance on DeWitt’s report: “[s]o the Court, having no real evidence
before it, has no choice but to accept General DeWitt’s own unsworn, self-
serving statement, untested by any cross-examination, that what he did was
reasonable.”20 In Trump v. Hawaii, the government and the Court similarly
relied on an unsworn, self-serving report—a 17-page report by the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) purporting to summarize the
results of a worldwide review of the extent to which various countries shared
information about individuals seeking entry into the United States.21
Worse, however, was that while the Court in Korematsu was given a copy
of DeWitt’s report (albeit a copy later discovered to have been altered, as
discussed below22), the government in Trump v. Hawaii refused to produce
the DHS report allegedly supporting the travel ban, and the Court upheld the
ban without even viewing it.23
As the coram nobis cases of the 1980s proved, the failure of courts to
question and examine the government’s claims of necessity can create fertile
ground for fraud and misrepresentation. In those cases, Messrs. Korematsu,
Yasui, and Hirabayashi brought successful coram nobis actions challenging
their wartime convictions based on proof that the World War II government
suppressed, altered, and destroyed material evidence that contradicted its
claim that its actions were based on military necessity.24 For example, the
government withheld from the Supreme Court intelligence reports from the
Korematsu Overruled? Far From It... 901
VOLUME 16 • ISSUE 3 • 2018
FBI, the FCC, and the Office of Naval Intelligence that refuted DeWitt’s
claims that Japanese Americans were engaged in espionage or sabotage.25
Further, the coram nobis cases established that, when it was discovered that
DeWitt’s Report contradicted the government’s arguments before the
Korematsu Supreme Court, the report was ordered altered, DeWitt’s “true”
report was ordered destroyed, and the altered version was provided to the
Supreme Court.26 Thus, at the same time the government argued that the
Court should defer to its judgment that its actions were required by military
necessity,27 it presented the Court a record manufactured to support that
judgment. While it cannot be said with certainty that the Court would have
discovered the government’s fraud if it conducted a more searching inquiry,
the Court’s deference to the government certainly gave the government much
room to argue what it wished.
Justice Sotomayor compared the government’s refusal to disclose the DHS
report with the government’s failure to disclose its intelligence reports during
World War II: “As here, the Government [in Korematsu] was unwilling to
reveal its own intelligence agencies’ views of the alleged security concerns
to the very citizens it purported to protect.”28 And she criticized the majority
for allowing the government to withhold the report: “Ignoring [the
President’s anti-Muslim rhetoric], the majority empowers the President to
hide behind an administrative review process that the Government refuses to
disclose to the public.”29
The concern about the administration’s refusal to disclose the DHS report
was also raised by Maryland Federal District Court Judge Theodore Chuang
in the related travel ban case of IRAP v. Trump. During oral argument on
October 16, 2017, Judge Chuang asked Justice Department attorney Hashim
Mooppan, “Are you representing to me now as an officer of the court that
there’s nothing in [the report] that’s inconsistent with the proclamation?”30
Mooppan evaded the question: “you can judge the proclamation on its own
terms.”31 Recalling the suppression of evidence proved in the coram nobis
cases, Judge Chuang asked, “So how is this different than Korematsu where
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they relied on an executive order by the president and many years after the
fact, it was determined that there was information within the justice
department that contradicted representation made to the court[?] . . . [C]an
you assure me that there’s nothing in [the DHS report] that’s inconsistent
with what’s in the proclamation because if it were, I would feel that would be
a material fact that you need to disclose.”32 Mooppan evaded again, arguing
that he could not “make representations about what’s in the report.”33 Further,
he argued that he need not disclose whether there were any disagreements
within the government because that information would be protected from
disclosure as part of the government’s “deliberative process.”34 However, he
stated, “[W]e stand behind the factual representations in the proclamation.”35
Third, just as the Court ignored the racist underpinnings of the
government’s actions in Korematsu, it turned a blind eye to the travel ban’s
xenophobic roots.36 Throughout its opinion upholding the travel ban, the
Court repeatedly emphasized the fact that the proclamation was neutral on its
face: “The text says nothing about religion.”37 The Court said that Korematsu
was different: “It is wholly inapt to liken that morally repugnant order [in
Korematsu], to a facially neutral policy denying certain foreign nationals the
privilege of admission.”38 The Court failed to recognize that Executive Order
9066 was also facially neutral; it similarly said nothing about race.39 Yet there
was no question that it was intended to authorize the removal of only the
Japanese American population on the West Coast. After exhaustive research,
the Congressional Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of
Civilians concluded, “Executive Order 9066 was not justified by military
necessity, and the decisions that followed it—detention, ending detention,
and ending exclusion—were not driven by analysis of military conditions.
The broad historical causes which shaped these decisions were race
prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political leadership.”40
Further, in the travel ban case, the Court went so far as to describe, but then
discount, statements bearing on the ban’s anti-Muslim roots. In Korematsu,
the Court dismissed any claim that the orders were based on racism, stating
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that “Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility
to him or his race”; instead, his exclusion was based on military necessity.41
In the travel ban case, the Court did much worse. The Court recounted just
part of President Trump’s anti-Muslim vitriol and then stated that vitriol did
not really matter. The Court quoted Trump’s campaign call for a “total and
complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States” and his statement
that “Islam hates us.” It quoted a campaign adviser who said that, after the
election, Trump asked him to “[s]how me the right way to do [the Muslim
ban] legally.”42 The Court, however, explained that these statements mattered
little in the context of the president’s wide discretion on matters of national
security: “the issue before us is not whether to denounce these statements. It
is instead the significance of those statements in reviewing a Presidential
directive, neutral on its face, addressing a matter within the core of executive
responsibility.”43
In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor condemned the travel ban as “driven
primarily by anti-Muslim animus, rather than by the Government’s asserted
national-security justifications.”44 She criticized the majority for holding
otherwise, “ignoring the facts, misconstruing our legal precedent, and turning
a blind eye to the pain and suffering the Proclamation inflicts upon countless
families and individuals, many of whom are United States citizens.”45 Justice
Sotomayor recounted the litany of statements showing the travel ban was
motivated by anti-Muslim hostility, including President Trump’s statements
“[W]e can’t allow people coming into this country who have this hatred of
the United States,”46 and she underscored that the Proclamation
“overwhelmingly targets Muslim-majority nations.”47 She pointed to
Trump’s statement that Roosevelt “did the same thing” with respect to the
internment of Japanese Americans during World War II.”48 She explained
that, in the travel ban case, as in Korematsu, “the Government invoked an ill-
defined national-security threat to justify an exclusionary policy of sweeping
proportion.”49 And, as in the travel ban case, the World War II “exclusion
order was rooted in dangerous stereotypes about, inter alia, a particular
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group’s supposed inability to assimilate and desire to harm the United
States.”50
In the end, the Court found President Trump’s “extrinsic” anti-Muslim
statements irrelevant because the travel ban was a facially neutral policy
within the President’s expansive powers over matters of immigration and
national security.51
As a consequence of all of the above, instead of effecting the end of
Korematsu, the Court “reloaded” the “loaded weapon” that Korematsu has
long represented. In his 1944 dissent in Korematsu, Justice Jackson warned
that the decision “lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any
authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.”52 The
Trump administration took up that loaded weapon, arguing both that its travel
ban was necessary to secure our country and that the courts have no role in
questioning that judgment. In upholding the Muslim travel ban, the Court,
just as it did in Korematsu, provided a rubber stamp to an egregious
discrimination and affirmed the principle that the courts should step aside
when the government incants the phrase “national security.”
Korematsu v. United States has been overruled in name only. The Supreme
Court’s decision in Trump v. Hawaii has instead solidified the pernicious
principle that Korematsu has represented for 74 years: judicial capitulation to
government-sponsored discrimination in the name of national security. While
no one might now cite Korematsu for that principle of judicial capitulation,
they might now cite Trump v. Hawaii.
During this time when anti-Muslim, anti-immigrant, and racist hostility
increasingly fuels public policy, we are each called upon to be civically
engaged to both provide and ensure responsible leadership.53 And those of us
who are lawyers are called upon to be persistent and creative in asking our
courts to exercise “watchful care” to make certain that government actors,
including the president, do not act outside the bounds of their authority and
that every person, especially the most vulnerable among us, is treated with
fairness and humanity.54
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1 Professor of Lawyering Skills and Director of the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law
and Equality at Seattle University School of Law, as well as a member of the legal team
that gained the vacation of Fred Korematsu’s World War II conviction. I am grateful to
Eric Yamamoto, Robert Chang, Dale Minami, and Don Tamaki for their thoughts and
assistance on this essay. I have chosen to use endnotes, not footnotes, so that the footnotes
do not distract from the flow of the essay.
2 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). In concluding that the president’s second
travel ban was rooted in anti-Muslim hostility, the Fourth Circuit declared, for example,
that it “in text speaks with vague words of national security, but in context drips with
religious intolerance, animus, and discrimination.” Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v.
Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 572 (4th Cir. 2017), vacated as moot, 138 S. Ct. 353 (mem.) (2017);
see also Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 268 (4th Cir. 2018)
(concluding that third travel ban based on religious animus).
3 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2423, responding to Justice Sotomayor’s statement that
“Today’s holding is all the more troubling given the stark parallels between the reasoning
of this case and that of Korematsu v. United States.” Id. at 2447 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
4 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2423.
5 The majority opinion did not itself say that the Court overruled Korematsu; instead, it
said that Korematsu had been overruled “in the court of history.” Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.
Ct. at 2423. However, Justice Sotomayor, in her dissent, characterizes the Court as
overruling it: “Today, the Court takes the important step of finally overruling Korematsu.”
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2448 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). This essay takes the view
that, while the Court may have overruled or repudiated Korematsu in words, it did not
overrule the most insidious legal principles it represents, that the Court instead
reinvigorated those principles, and that those principles remain a danger today.
6 If the Supreme Court has denounced Korematsu at all, it has done so after the case and
the wartime Japanese American incarceration have been soundly denounced by legal
commentators, officials at every level of government, and the lower courts. See, e.g.,
Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases—A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489, 503
(1945); Eric Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited—Correcting the Injustice of Extraordinary
Government Excess and Lax Judicial Review: Time for a Better Accommodation of
National Security Concerns and Civil Liberties, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (1986),
https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol26/iss1/1/ [hereinafter Yamamoto,
Korematsu Revisited]. In 1976, President Gerald Ford formally rescinded Executive Order
9066, which provided authority for the incarceration: “I call upon the American people to
affirm with me this ‘American Promise’―that we have learned from the tragedy of that
long-ago experience forever to treasure liberty and justice for each individual American,
and resolve that this kind of action shall never again be repeated.” Proclamation No. 4417,
41 Fed. Reg. 7741 (Feb. 19, 1976). In 1983, the Congressional Commission on Wartime
Relocation and Internment of Civilians concluded that “Executive Order 9066 was not
justified by military necessity, and the decisions that followed it―detention, ending
detention, and ending exclusion―were not driven by analysis of military conditions. The
broad historical causes which shaped these decisions were race prejudice, war hysteria and
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a failure of political leadership.” COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND
INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS (CWRIC), PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED: REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON THE RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS (1983) 18. On August
10, 1988, President Ronald Reagan signed into law the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which
provided a formal apology and redress of $20,000 to each survivor of the wartime removal
and incarceration and established a fund to educate the public on the lessons to be learned
from that dark chapter in history. He stated, “[H]ere we admit a wrong; here we reaffirm
our commitment as a nation to equal justice under the law.” Civil Liberties Act, Pub. L.
No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (1988) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1989–
1989(d) (1988)). In vacating Fred Korematsu’s World War II conviction, Judge Marilyn
Hall Patel referred to the wartime incarceration of Japanese Americans as a “profound and
publicly acknowledged injustice,” Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1413
(D.C. Cal. 1984), and in vacating Gordon Hirabayashi’s wartime conviction, Judge Mary
Schroeder wrote, “A United States citizen who is convicted of a crime on account of race
is lastingly aggrieved,” Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 607 (9th Cir. 1987).
7 Commentators have taken a range of views on the effect of the Supreme Court’s
disavowal of the Korematsu decision in Trump v. Hawaii. Some view the Court’s
disavowal of Korematsu positively. See Amy Davidson Sorkin, One Really Good Thing in
the Supreme Court’s Travel-Ban Ruling: Korematsu Is Gone, NEW YORKER, June 26,
2018, https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/one-really-good-thing-in-the-
supreme-courts-travel-ban-ruling-korematsu-is-gone [https://perma.cc/L6L8-L7N5]
(expressing the belief that the decision placed limits on executive power). Some legal
commentators said the Court’s language purporting to overrule Korematsu has no legal or
binding effect on future courts because it was dicta—superfluous legal reasoning not
necessary to upholding the travel ban. See Dictum, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dictum [https://perma.cc/9Q2L-NU7M]
(defining dictum as “a judge’s expression of opinion on a point other than the precise issue
involved in determining a case”); Scott Bomboy, Did the Supreme Court just overrule the
Korematsu decision? (June 26, 2018), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/did-the-
supreme-court-just-overrule-the-korematsu-decision [https://perma.cc/QZ2X-N5VV]
(quoting Professor Lyle Denniston’s view that the Court did not actually overrule
Korematsu because, among other things, the court did not actually state that it was
overruling the case and its language was dicta, “statements made in a court opinion that
do not affect the actual outcome”). Most commentators, however, shared the concern that
the Court did not at all overrule the dangerous principles that Korematsu represented;
instead, as it did in Korematsu, it turned a blind eye to discrimination carried out in the
guise of national security. Anil Kalhan, Trump v. Hawaii and Chief Justice Roberts’s
“Korematsu Overruled” Parlor Trick (June 29, 2018),
https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/trump-v-hawaii-and-chief-justice-robertss-korematsu-
overruled-parlor-trick/ [https://perma.cc/TK47-GHDB] (explaining that “a careful reading
of both Trump v. Hawaii and Korematsu demonstrates that the Court has overruled
precisely nothing[;] . . . [i]nstead, [it] purport[ed] to ‘overrule’ a narrow, distorted version
of Korematsu while simultaneously embracing and replicating that decision’s actual logic
and reasoning”); Nimra Azmi, The Roberts Court Would’ve Allowed Japanese Internment,
SLATE (June 27, 2018) https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/06/trump-v-hawaii-
korematsu-v-united-states-the-roberts-court-wouldve-allowed-japanese-internment.html
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[https://perma.cc/C487-XWWY] (explaining that the Court’s “overruling” was so narrow
that it “has done nothing to prevent the possible replication of Korematsu”); Harold Hongju
Koh, Symposium: Trump v. Hawaii—Korematsu’s ghost and national-security
masquerades (June 28, 2018), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/symposium-trump-v-
hawaii-korematsus-ghost-and-national-security-masquerades/ [https://perma.cc/76WZ-
9N9U] (calling the Court’s statement that “Korematsu has nothing to do with this case”
dissembling self-deception when both the World War II order and the travel ban “rested on
. . . judging and harming people based not on the content of their individual character, but
on their membership in a supposedly dangerous group . . . whose dangerousness the
government never proved”); Charlie Savage, Korematsu, Notorious Supreme Court Ruling
on Japanese Internment, Is Finally Tossed Out, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/26/us/korematsu-supreme-court-ruling.html
[https://perma.cc/7ZCU-H8L4] (quoting Professor Hitoshi Motomura as stating,
“[o]verruling Korematsu the way the court did in this case reduces the overruling to
symbolism that is so bare that it is deeply troubling, given the parts of the reasoning behind
Korematsu that live on in [the travel ban] decision: a willingness to paint with a broad
brush by nationality, race or religion by claiming national security grounds”).
8 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). See text
accompanying n.52.
9 The Korematsu Court technically upheld only the “exclusion order,” the order that
Japanese Americans could not be present on the West Coast; it did not decide the legality
of their incarceration. 323 U.S. at 219, 222. In reality, as the Court recognized, the
exclusion orders necessarily required detention. Id. at 222–23 (“The power to exclude
includes the power to do it by force if necessary. And any forcible measure must necessarily
entail some degree of detention or restraint whatever method of removal is selected.”). The
Court, however, chose not to decide explicitly whether the detention of Japanese
Americans was lawful, saying that exclusion and detention involved different questions
and that it could address the issue of detention another day. Id. at 222. In doing so, the
Court separated the inseparable; removal was part of one seamless program that resulted
in incarceration. Id. at 243 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the military orders
were drawn in such a way that Korematsu could comply with them only by “submission to
[military] custody, examination, and transportation out of the territory, to be followed by
indeterminate confinement in detention camps”). One could hardly imagine when the Court
felt it would decide the constitutionality of the program of incarceration; as of December
1944, when the Court decided Korematsu, many Japanese Americans had been
incarcerated for over 2-1/2 years. In fact, the Court never did address whether the original
incarceration was lawful. While the Court in Ex parte Endo, decided the same day as
Korematsu, held that the government could no longer continue to incarcerate concededly
loyal Japanese Americans, it did not rule on whether it was proper to place them in camps
to begin with. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 302 (U.S. 1944). For purposes of this essay,
and in the minds of most people, the wartime Supreme Court in effect, although perhaps
not in words, validated both the wartime removal and, by implication, the incarceration.
10 Rostow, supra note 6, at 503 (referring to the Supreme Court’s Hirabayashi, Yasui, and
Korematsu decisions as “a bewildering and unimpressive series of opinions); Lorraine K.
Bannai and Dale Minami. Internment during World War II and Litigations, in ASIAN
AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 755, 768-75 (H.
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Kim, ed., 1992) (explaining how the wartime Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui cases are
“analytically unsound, inconsistent, both internally and in relation to each other, and
disregard obvious precedent”).
11 See text accompanying n,24 regarding the suppression of evidence before the Supreme
Court.
12 See ERIC YAMAMOTO, IN THE SHADOW OF KOREMATSU: DEMOCRATIC LIBERTIES AND
NATIONAL SECURITY 5 (2018) [hereinafter Yamamoto, Shadow of Korematsu] (observing
that Korematsu has stood not only for “its formal approval of the wartime racial exclusions
but also its embrace of judicial passivity whenever the government intones national
security”).
13 In Trump v. Hawaii, the Court applied a highly deferential standard in reviewing the
constitutionality of the travel ban, one that would uphold the ban if it was simply
“plausibly related” to the Government’s stated objective to protect the country. 138 S. Ct.
at 2420 (citing R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980)). In their amicus brief to
the Supreme Court in Trump v. Hawaii, the children of Fred Korematsu, Minoru Yasui,
and Gordon Hirabayashi warned the Court of the danger of deferring to the government as
it did in their fathers’ wartime cases. Brief of Karen Korematsu, Jay Hirabayashi, Holly
Yasui, the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality, Civil Rights Organizations,
and National Bar Associations of Color as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, at 20,
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17-965), 2018 WL 1586445, at *20 (“This
Court need not look [further than the wartime Japanese American incarceration] for a
reminder of the constitutional costs and human suffering that flow from the Judiciary’s
failure to rein in sweeping governmental action against disfavored minorities.”); see also
Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited, supra note 6; Kalhan, supra note 7 (drawing parallels
between the Court’s deference to the government’s national security judgments in
Korematsu and Trump v. Hawaii). For an insightful analysis of Korematsu as dangerous
precedent that courts should defer to the government when it claims its actions are justified
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